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SURVIVAL OF TORT ACTIONS UNDER
FEDERAL MARITIME LAW
Recovery for tortious maritime injury resulting in death histori-
cally has consisted of a confusing and often irreconcilable body of
law arising variously from federal statutes,' state statutes2 or deci-
sional law3
 depending upon how far from shore the injury oc-
curred, 4 the type of damages sought, 5 and the status of the victim:6
recovery for harm just over three miles from shore might be allowed
whereas damages for harm suffered a hundred yards closer to shore
might not be allowed; 7
 a wrongful death action might be maintain-
able if the tort occurred within the coastal waters of one state but not
of another;8
 an action for identical injuries might be maintainable
by a non-seaman, but not by a seaman. 9
Many of the anomalies in this area of maritime law have been
remedied in a piecemeal fashion over the past 55 years through
statutes and court decisions. In 1886, the Supreme Court unsettled
maritime law when it decided in The Harrisburie that a wrongful
death action did not survive in admiralty, absent a statute." A
partial remedy for that void was provided in 1920 by the enactment
of the Death on the High Seas Act' 2
 [hereinafter DOHSA] which
allowed an action for wrongful death in international waters. How-
ever, in state coastal waters, recovery for wrongful death remained
dependent upon the existence of state wrongful death statutes."
Thus, for those dying in the territorial waters of one state recovery
might be had, but not for those dying in the waters of another state.
Further, DOHSA limited recovery to "pecuniary loss""—generally
held not to include damages for "pain and sufferine 15—so the scope
l Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68
(1970).
2 See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
, 3
 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886).
• See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
' See Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972).
• See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
7
 Compare Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), with Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1966).
11
 See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
9
 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
10 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
" Id. at 213.
12
 46 U.S.C. § 761-68 ( 1 9 70).
13
 See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 591 (1959).
14
 46 U.S.C. f 762 (1970). The measure of damages for death on the high seas is
generally the amount of pecuniary benefit which the beneficiary might reasonably expect to
receive had the deceased lived. The S.S. Black Gull, 90 F.2d 619, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1937); The
City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
13
 Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972); Canillas v. Joseph M. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp, 560, 561 (D. Mass. 1950).
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of damages in a wrongful death action within and without the three
mile limit could be different depending upon the peculiarities of the
applicable state statutes.
On the same day Congress enacted DOHSA, it passed the Jones
Act 16
 which permitted seamen to bring a wrongful death action for
injuries occurring both on the high•seas 17 and in state waters. 113 The
act also allowed seamen's tort actions to survive their death.I 9 The
Jones Act, however, only allowed actions based on negligence 2° and
not on the theory of unseaworthiness which is a strict liability
theory. 21
 The result was that a seaman could not bring an action for
wrongful death based on unseaworthiness in state waters, but he
could recover damages for injuries occurring on the high seas by
supplementing his Jones Act action with an action under DOHSA. 22
The allowance of survival actions by the Jones Act but not by
DOHSA also raised the question whether Congress specifically in-
tended that tort actions arising from injuries to non-seamen on the
high seas, not survive.
In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc. ,23
 took a major step in clarifying maritime law. In that
case an action was brought for wrongful death when a longshore-
man was killed aboard a vessel within the navigable waters of
Florida. 24
 After the district court dismissed the suit, 25 the court of
appeals certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether
the state's wrongful death statute allowed recovery for unseaworthi-
ness. 26
 When the Florida court answered that its state statute did
not allow an action based on unieaworthiness, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision, following the rule that absent a
statute there is no action for wrongful death. 27 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, overruled The Harrisburg, and allowed a federal
maritime wrongful death action. 28 The holding in Moragne freed
recovery for wrongful death in state waters from the peculiarities of
16 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
17 See, e.g., Gerardo v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
See, e.g., Sanderson v. Sause Bros. Ocean Towing Co., 114 F. Supp. 849 (D. Ore.
1953).
16 See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968).
20 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964); Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38, 48 (1930).
21
 If an individual is injured because a vessel Was unable to withstand the perils of an
ordinary voyage at sea, he may seek compensation based on a theory of unseaworthiness.
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96, 100 (1944).
22 Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958) (dictum); Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1966).
33 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
24 Id. at 376.
25 Id.
26 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
27 Id.
20
 398 U.S. at 409.
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state wrongful death statutes by providing a uniformly applicable
federal maritime wrongful death action. It also allowed a wrongful
death action based on a claim of unseaworthiness brought on behalf
of seamen killed in state territorial waters because a Jones Act suit
could be supplemented with a Moragne-type action. 29
While Moragne served to bring order to maritime law relating
to wrongful death, it left unresolved the question as to whether the
remedy it fashioned is limited to state territorial waters or applies to
the high seas as well. Consequently, courts have divided on this
point. 30 The significance of the issue as to the scope of the holding in
Moragne derives from the fact that damages for pain and suffering
are recoverable under Moragne 3 ' but not under DOHSA which
limits recovery, to "pecuniary loss." 32 Moragne also left untouched
and unsettled the law governing survival of actions: 33
 damages for
pain and suffering were recoverable for maritime tort injuries, 34 but
if the victim died, the chances for recovery of damages often died
with him because lower courts have followed Supreme Court dictum
that, absent a statute, actions do not survive. 35
Against this background, the First Circuit recently squarely
confronted the problem of maritime survival actions, in Barbe v.
Drummond, 36 and filled a post-Moragne gap in maritime law by
holding that there exists a federal maritime survival action. 37 The
First Circuit opinion, if accepted, will dispel the uncertainty in
maritime law which was left unresolved by the Moragne decision.
Barbe arose out of the following facts: On May 17, 1969, Drum-
mond and Janet Barbe, his guest, left Massachusetts in a 26 foot
powerboat planning to cross Massachusetts Bay. 38 Drummond was
too inexperienced with the operation of his craft to attempt such a
29
 Id. at 396 n.12.
3°
 Compare Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 1 (KIX La. 1971) ("Though Moragne
dealt with the problem of death in coastal waters, ... nothing in the opinion suggests that the
maritime right is to be denied those whose death is brought about wrongfully on the High
Seas." Id. at 7.), with Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1971).
31
 Green v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central
Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); In re Farrell
Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91, 93-94 (E.D. La. 1971).
32 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
33
 Wrongful death statutes permit a designated class of individuals to recover for the
injury to them occasioned by the loss of the deceased. Survival statutes permit the right of
action the deceased would have had, had he lived, to be brought by his estate. For a
discussion of the difference between wrongful death and survival statutes, see text accom-
panying notes 75-77.
3°
 See Heredia v. Davis, 12 F.2d 500, 501 (4th 'Cir. 1926); Vastano v. Partownership
Brovigtank, 158 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
35
 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) (dictum).
36
 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974),
37
 Id. at 799. While the First Circuit does not specifically address itself to the matter, it
seems probable that the federal maritime survival action is applicable to all admiralty cases
whether arising from incidents within or without the three mile limit. Cf. Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
3° 507 F.2d at 796
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voyage, particularly on a stormy night. 39 This inexperience resulted
in the craft striking a pillar of a bridge which crosses the North
River, 40
 Driving the ship into the chopping surf caused the frame
which was broken by the impact to gradually open.'" It was not
until much later, while on the bay, that Drummond noticed that the
craft was taking on water. After inept attempts to obtain help and
save the craft, he and Janet Barbe abandoned it. 42 Janet Barbe died
of exposure after several hours in the icy waters. 43
The administrator of Janet Barbe's estate brought suit against
Drummond to recover, inter alia, for Janet's conscious pain and
suffering." The district court found the defendant negligent and
granted the plaintiff $15,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,500 for
funeral expenses. 45 On appeal the plaintiff advanced three theories
upon which the court of appeals might sustain the award of dam-
ages for pain and suffering. Recognizing that DOHSA has been held
not to allow recovery for pain and suffering," the plaintiff first
contended that the court could look to state law for a survival
statute to supplement federal maritime law. 47 Second, the plaintiff
suggested that the court could allow recovery for pain and suffering
under the federal maritime wrongful death act action created by
Moragne." The third theory advanced by the plaintiff was that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Moragne provided sufficient support to
allow a federal maritime survival action."
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, re-
versing in part the order of the District Court HELD: a federal
maritime survival action, which permits the deceased's estate to
recover for pain and suffering, is allowable to supplement the
statutory recovery scheme of DOHSA. 5° The decision of the First
Circuit, if followed, would complete the slowly evolving body of
federal maritime law dealing with recovery when a victim of a
maritime tort dies. The Barbe decision introduces the same certainty
and uniformity to the law of maritime survival actions as did the
Moragne decision to the law of maritime wrongful death actions.
If the reasoning of the First Circuit in Barbe prevails, the
scheme of recovery when the victim of a tort arising in admiralty
39 Id. at 797.




49 Id. at 795.
43 Id. at 796.
46 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
47 507 F.2d at 797.
49 Id. at 798.
49
 Id. at 799.
'° Id. The court also held that the weight of the evidence supported the finding of
negligence, id. at 797, and that funeral expenses are not recoverable in an action for wrongful
death based on the Death on the High Seas Act. Id. at 802. The scope of this comment,
however, is limited to analysis of the award for pain and suffering.
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dies will be as follows: as to the wrongful death of a seaman, an
-action can be brought under the Jones Act and supplemented with
an action based on unseaworthiness by use of DOHSA on the high
seas and Moragne in state waters; as to the wrongful death of a
non-seaman, an action can be maintained by employing DOHSA on
the high seas and Moragne in state territorial waters; a seaman's
Jones Act action will survive his death pursuant to that Act and his
general maritime actions will survive under the Barbe rule; a non-
seaman's general maritime actions will survive under Barbe.
The decision in Barbe will be analyzed in this comment in light
of the existing framework of maritime law on which it is superim-
posed. Initially, an inquiry will be pursued as to whether the
Moragne decision—on its facts dealing with an incident occurring in
coastal waters—should be limited in its application to occurrences in
state territorial waters, or whether Moragne could govern incidents
on the high seas alongside DOHSA so as to obviate the dilemma
presented in the Barbe case. It will be shown that Moragne cannot
properly be construed as controlling tort claims arising on the high
seas. The analysis will continue with consideration of several issues:
whether Barbe conflicts with the existing statutory regulation of
claims arising in international waters; whether the use of state
survival statutes would have provided a sounder legal basis on
which to decide Barbe; and finally, whether the policies underlying
Moragne apply equally to survival of actions, so as to justify the
First Circuit's creation of a federal survival action.
Attention should first be focused on whether the court in Barbe
correctly concluded that the Moragne decision—on its facts applying
to torts committed in coastal waters"—should be limited in its
application to occurrences in state territorial waters, or whether
Moragne could operate on the high seas alongside DOHSA. This is
essential because pain and suffering are recoverable under
Moragne 52 but not under DOHSA." Thus if the court in Barbe had
found that Moragne applied to injuries on the high seas, the court
could have granted the plaintiff damages based on existing law and
foregone any discussion of survival of tort claims. It is the conclu-
sion that Moragne only applies to occurrences in state waters,
coupled with the fact that DOHSA does not permit recovery for
pain and suffering, that caused the court in Barbe to reach the
survival issue.
Language in Moragne suggests that the Supreme Court spe-
cifically meant to limit Moragne to its facts and did not at the time
intend to decide whether the newly created federal wrongful death
action applied to the high seas or whether Congress had precluded
judicial action in that area. 54
 However, the specific language of
51 398 U.S. at 376.
52 See cases cited at note 31 supra.
53 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
54
 "We find that Congress has given no affirmative indication of an intent to preclude the
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Moragne is not necessarily dispositive of the point at issue. An
understanding of the anomalies in maritime law which the Court-
sought to rectify is instructive in attempting to ascertain the in-
tended scope of the remedy the Court provided.
The first anomaly was that failure to provide a seaworthy
vessel would result in liability if the victim were merely injured 55
but frequently would not if he were killed because, under the rule of
The Harrisburg, S 6
 recovery was made to depend upon state stat-
utes." Moreover, if failure to provide a seaworthy ship resulted in
death on the high seas, liability attached because a claim of unsea-
worthiness could be brought under DOHSA. 58 Yet in state waters,
where recovery was dependent upon state statutes which may
exclude unseaworthiness claims, the plaintiff was often without a
cause of action for wrongful death. 59
 Finally, a seaman could not
recover for death caused by unseaworthiness within state waters,
while longshoremen who had assumed some of the duties of seamen
could recover, if the state statute provided a remedy."
Thus it becomes apparent that the court in Moragne never
addressed a need for judicial alteration of the scheme of recovery for
accidents on the high seas. Rather, its attention focused on the
inequitable application of the law in state territorial waters—the gap
left by federal legislation and decisional law. 6 ' The Court's creation
of a federal maritime wrongful death right applicable to accidents in
state territorial waters was meant to abolish dependence upon var-
ied state statutes for recovery62 and to allow the representative of a
seaman, dying in state territorial waters, to bring an action for
wrongful death based on unseaworthiness. 63 Moragne thus intro-
duced uniformity: on the high seas a seaman could supplement his
judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death to persons in the situation of the peti-
tioner." 398 U.S. at 393. "We conclude that the Death on the High Seas Act was not intended
to preclude the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in
situations not covered by the Act." Id. at 402.
55
 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., .362 U.S. 539, 544-49 (1960); Mahnich v,
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99, 103 (1944).
56
 119 U.S. 199 (1886). No action will lie under general maritime law for the wrongful
death of a person absent an applicable statute. Id. at 213.
57
 398 U.S. at 395. See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 590-91 (1959).
58
 See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n,4 (1958).
59 398 U.S. at 395.
68
 Id. at 395-96. This is the result of two interpretations of the Jones Act. First, the Jones
Act, which Congress passed in 1920 along with DOHSA, was held to allow recovery only for
negligence, not for unseaworthiness, which was a strict liability theory. See cases cited at note
22 supra. Second, in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), the Supreme
Court held that the Jones Act was the exclusive method of recovery for seamen and could not
be supplemented by state wrongful death statutes. Id. at 154-55.
61 "Indeed, Moragne, which was essentially a response to a gap in maritime remedies for
deaths occurring in state territorial waters, explicitly counsels against the sort of tabula rasa
restructuring of the law of admiralty undertaken by the majority." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 596 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
62 398 U.S. at 401.
63
 Id. at 396 n.12.
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Jones Act action for wrongful death based on negligence with a
DOHSA action based on unseaworthiness64 and in state territorial
waters, he could supplement his Jones Act action with a Moragne-
type action. 65
There are additional arguments which support the contention
that the scope of the Moragne opinion was intended to be limited to
actions arising out of accidents occurring in state waters. Although
Congress has largely left to the courts the responsibility for fashion-
ing maritime law," Congress does have paramount power in this
area. 67 It can either create or take away a cause of action within the
admiralty, jurisdiction of the federal courts. 68 "If it has this power, it
may certainly specify the details of the remedy which it provides." 69
Since Congress created a wrongful death action on the high seas-
DOHSA—which limited damages to "pecuniary loss," 70 it could be
argued that Congress meant to preclude judicial expansion of the
scope of damages for wrongful death occurring on the high seas.
Moreover, given the fact that wrongful death actions arising from
events on the high seas have been regulated by Congress, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would have intended Moragne to
apply alongside DOHSA without some discussion concluding that
Congress did not intend DOHSA to be the exclusive remedy for
wrongful death on the high seas.
Additionally, assuming arguendo that Moragne applies to
wrongful death actions stemming from incidents on the high seas,
damages for pain and suffering still need not be considered recover-
able. Although such damages have been awarded under Moragne,
the cases in which such awards were made have all involved claims
arising in state waters.'" This line of cases does not seem inconsist-
ent with Congressional regulation of maritime 'claims since the
legislature, by not extending DOHSA to state territorial waters,
clearly demonstrated that it was not concerned with uniformity of
damages within and without the three mile limit. 72 In contrast, in
" Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1966).
6
' 398 U.S. at 396 n.12. This view of Moragne as filling the gap in the federal statutory
scheme—its failure to provide a wrongful death action in state waters—was apparently
embraced by the Eighth Circuit in Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe & Assoc., Inc., 466 F.2d 903
(8th Cir. 1972), where the court held that the clasi of beneficiaries under Moragne should be
the same as under DOHSA so as to promote uniformity within and without the three mile
limit. Id. at 908 n.7.
66 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
6 7 See Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934): "The Congress thus has
paramount power to determine the martime law which shall prevail throughout the country."
Id. at 43.
" See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963); O'Donnell v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1943).
69 Fitzgerald v. A.L, Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1971).
70 See note 14 supra.
7 ' See cases cited at note 31 supra.
" Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 n.22 (1974); Greene v. Vantage
S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir, 1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d
137, 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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wrongful death actions based on occurrences on the high seas,
Congress has clearly delineated the scope of damages. In light of this
Congressional mandate, arguably courts should construe the judi-
cially created wrongful death action as mirroring DOHSA. This
"mirror construction" would result in damages being limited to
"pecuniary loss" whether the cause of action arose under Moragne or
DOHSA. Consequently, it would seem that the First Circuit, in
Barbe, correctly declined to justify its decision to permit recovery
for pain and suffering by construing Moragne as permitting such
recovery in a tort claim arising out of an incident on the high seas.
While the First Circuit did reject the plaintiff's second theory
for sustaining the award of damages for pain and suffering, his third
theory which proposed the survival of maritime tort actions, was
accepted. The First Circuit created a federal maritime survival
action by analogizing the policies operative in Barbe, to those ac-
cepted in Moragne." In examining the correctness of the Barbe
decision, two issues must be addressed: first, whether Congress has
preempted the field of survival of maritime tort actions; and second,
if it has not, upon what theory survival of actions should be al-
lowed.
In deciding whether Congress has preempted the field of sur-
vival of maritime tort actions, thereby barring judicial action, it
must be understood that wrongful death statutes have long been
considered distinct from survival statutes. 74 Survival statutes were
designed to modify the common law rule that personal tort actions
would die with the plaintiff. 75 These statutes permit the executor or
administrator of the decedent's estate to bring the tort claim the
deceased would have had but for his death. Generally, they do not
permit recovery for harm suffered by the family of the deceased as a
result of the decendent's demise. 76 Wrongful death statutes, on the
other hand, provide for a representative to bring an action on behalf
of a designated group of individuals who have suffered an injury,
either financial or emotional, as a result of the death of the victim. 77
Congress, in enacting DOHSA, provided an action for wrong-
ful death." However, DOHSA contains no provision for the sur-
vival of actions. 79
 Therefore, given the distinct nature of wrongful
73 507 F.2d at 799.
74
 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974); Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia,
344 Pa. 643, 647-48, 26 Aid 659, 661 (1942).
75
 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 24.1, at 1284 & n.2 (1956); W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971).
76
 See Livingston, Survival of Torts Actions, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 63, 66-68 (1949);
Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114,
128-30 (1924).
77 W. Prosser, supra note 75, § 127, at 906.
76
 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). See Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp.
560, 561 (D. Mass. 1950); Pickles v. F. Leyland & Co., 10 F.2d 371, 372 (D. Mass. 1925);
Comment, 60 Colum. L..Rev. 534, 536 n.16 (1960).
79
 See Comment, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 534, 536 n.16 (1960).
808
TORT ACTIONS
death and survival actions, it would seem that the creation by
Congress of a wrongful death action on the high seas has not ipso
facto precluded judicial creation of a separate survival action. In-
deed, many states have statutes providing for both actions" without
any apparent difficulties such as double recovery. 81
A further possible indicator of whether Congress intended to
disallow survival of actions growing out of events on the high seas is
the Jones Act, which was passed at the same time as DOHSA. The
Jones Act extended coverage of the Federal Employers Liability
Act" [hereinafter FELA] to seamen." FELA expressly allows both
for wrongful death and for survival of tort claims" and therefore so
does the Jones Act for it mandates that the rights enjoyed by those
originally covered by FELA (railroad employees) be enjoyed by
seamen." The argument has been advanced that since the Jones
Act, passed at the same time as DOHSA, provides for a survival
action while DOHSA does not, it should be assumed that Congress
intended to limit recovery on the high seas for non-seamen to
wrongful death." However, an examination of the legislative his-
tory of DOHSA shows that Congress never considered the question
of survival of actions." Nor does there seem to be any policy reason
for allowing an action of a seaman to survive under the Jones Act
and denying that right to a non-seaman under DOHSA." The
allowance of survival of actions under the Jones Act was probably
not a conscious decision by the Congress; it was probably fortuitous,
occasioned by incorporation of FELA into the Jones Act. 89
 This
would appear to be the case because the Jones Act, while expressly
allowing only a wrongful death action, incorporates the remedial
procedures of FELA which include survival of actions. This
suggests that Congress was not concerned with survival of actions
go See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.01 (Supp. 1973) (survival of actions); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 895.03 (Supp. 1973) (wrongful death). For a partial listing of states having both survival and
wrongful death statutes see Note, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 980, 981 n.23 (1931).
B' If recovery is allowed under both DOHSA and a survival action, collateral estoppel
could apply to prevent double recovery. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573,
592-95 (1974).
82
 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
83 See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968).
84 Recovery for wrongful death is permitted by 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970) and survival of
claims is made possible by 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1970).
83 See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S, 38, 40-41 (1930); Hutchison v. Pacific-
Atlantic S.S. Co., 217 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir. 1954); Nordquist v. United States Trust Co.,
188 F.2d 776, 777 (2d Cir. 1951). •
88
 This argument was made by the defendant in Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438
F.2d 1386, 1390 (3d Cir. 1971).
at See S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess, 3 (1919); H.R. Rep. No, 674, 66th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1920); 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-86 (1920).
88 G. Gilmore & C. flack, The Law of Admiralty 308 (1957).
88 See O'Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery: The Need for Legisla-
tive Reform, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 648, 654 (1964); Comment, The Application of State Survival
Statutes in Maritime Causes, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 534, 537 (1960).
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when enacting either DOHSA or the Jones Act." If this analysis is
accurate, it would appear that the failure of Congress to include a
provision for the survival of actions in DOHSA should not be read
as an affirmative Congressional direction to disallow survival ac-
tions.
• There have been several decisions supporting the view that the
remedies offered in DOHSA are exclusive; barring recovery under
any other theory of liability when a tort results in an individual's
death on the high seas." However, a majority of opinions supports
the contention that DOHSA does not provide the sole method of
recovery when death occurs on the high seas. 92 The Supreme Court
in Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 93 has subscribed to this
majority view, stating in dictum that an action stemming from a
tort committed on the high seas can be maintained under a state
survival statute to compensate the estate of the decedent for dam-
ages he suffered before his death. 94 This authority, combined with
an understanding of the history and scope of DOHSA and the Jones
Act, suggest that the legislature did not intend to limit recovery on
the high seas to the provisions of DOHSA. Consequently, the Barbe
court's creation of a federal maritime survival action, covering ac-
tions arising in international waters, does not intrude upon Congres-
sional prerogatives.
Once it is determined that Congress has not prohibited the
survival of maritime actions, the question arises as to the proper
theory under which to allow survival actions. One course is that
advocated by the plaintiff in Barbe in his first theory and adopted
by the Third Circuit in Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp." In Dugas
the plaintiff brought an action to recover for the pain and suffering
experienced by his daughter who died in a plane crash in interna-
tional waters. 96 The Third Circuit noted that DOHSA, which pre-
cludes recovery for pain and suffering, is solely a wrongful death
statute and need not be read as preempting the distinct remedy
embodied in state survival statutes." Thus the court allowed recov-
9° See O'Day, supra note 89, at 654 n.35.
• " See Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1390 (3d Cir. 1971); Igneri v.
CIE de Transports Oceaniques, 323 7.2d 257, 266 n.21 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
949 (1964); Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nay. Co., 10 F. Supp. 677, 678
(E.D.N. Y. 1935).
92 See Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dictum);
Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468, 473 (S.D,N.Y. 1962); United States v. The S.S.
Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905, 908-09 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub, nom. United States v. Texas
Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911, 916
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
92 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
" Id. at 430 n.4.
" 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971), cited in Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 798 (1st
Cir. 1974).
96 438 F.2d at 1387.
97 Id. at 1388.
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ery under a Pennsylvania survival statute." This rationale, which
has been employed by several other courts, 99 does not conflict with
earlier Supreme Court dictum that, absent a statute, maritime ac-
tions do not survive.'"
The court in Barbe cited Dugas with approval, noting that its
approach avoided conflict with DOHSA,'°' and that there appeared
to be no constitutional bar to applying state statutes to actions
arising from occurrences on the high seas.' 02 However, the First
Circuit in Barbe noted two deficiencies in the Dugas approach. 103
First, a federal court would be required to divine not only whether a
state survival statute was to apply to admiralty claims, but also
whether it applied to claims arising from Worts which occur on the
high seas. From the date of The Harrisburg until Congress created a
wrongful death action by enacting DOHSA in 1920, federal courts
performed the same divination for wrongful death statutes and it
proved unsatisfactory because few state wrongful death statutes
were meant to apply to the high seas.'" A similar result could be
expected if attempts are made to apply state survival statutes to
actions based•on a tort committed on the high seas. It is submitted
that few, if any, state legislatures, when enacting a survival statute,
considered the possibility of their statute applying to the high seas
since Dugas and similar decisions are relatively few and of recent
vintage. Consequently, many plaintiffs will face uncertainty as to
whether a particular state survival statute will afford them a remedy
for claims arising on the high seas.
The second objection to the Dugas approach was that it makes
recovery dependent upon the existence of a state statute. Before
Moragne, recovery for a wrongful death was dependent upon the
existence of a state statute. It was,this dependency that the Moragne
court sought to cure in creating a federal wrongful death action to
govern wrongful death in state waters.'°5 Similarly, Barbe is desir-
9° Id. at 1392.
99 See cases cited at note 92 supra.
'°° Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) (dictum). The
approach taken by the court in Dugas comports with earlier Supreme Court dictum that a
cause of action arising from an event on the high seas can survive the tort victim's death if a
pertinent state statute is deemed to apply to incidents on the high seas. Kernan v. American
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958). However, it should be noted that Kernan is a
pre-Moragne case. In light of the Court's holding in Moragne and the policies it found
persuasive, it seems that the Court would now prefer an approach similar to that taken by the
First Circuit in Barbe.
'°' 507 F.2d at 798.
1 °2 Id. at 798 n.2.
105 Id. at 798.
loo Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 n.15 (1970).
105 "Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law
will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies
that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively
maritime substantive concepts." Id. at 401.
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able in that it eliminates the confusion and inequity resulting from
dependence upon the existence of a state survival statute. A con-
trary result in Barbe would have been regressive, resulting in a
scheme of recovery governing the survival of tort actions which
would mirror that for wrongful death actions before Moragne.
Moreover, it was emphasized in Moragne that Iflederal law,
rather than state, is the more appropriate remedy for violation of the
federally imposed duties of maritime law." 1 °6 A fortiori, in Barbe,
where the claim arose in international waters, it would seem more
important to allow a federal remedy to provide access to a federal
right. A federal right should be enjoyed uniformly by all the
citizenry.'" Yet under the Dugas approach, individuals in an
otherwise federal domain would be refused a federal right because a
state failed to enact a survival statute or because a court interprets
such a statute as not applicable to actions arising from events on the
high seas. This is the very situation the Supreme Court sought to
rectify in Moragne as to wrongful death actions and which the
Barbe approach avoids with respect to the survival of actions.
Given the -policies of uniformity and fairness found' persuasive in
Moragne, the course taken in Barbe—creating a uniform federal
remedy—appears preferable to that taken in Dugas.
In Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Associates, Inc., i 08 a case
differing from Barbe only in that it involved a wrong committed in
coastal waters, the Eighth Circuit previously reached a conclusion
similar to that of the First Circuit. In that case, personal representa-
tives of the decedents' estates brought an action after a vessel which
was carrying the decedents capsized and sank in the Red River,
within the state boundaries of Arkansas.'" The court noted that
although Arkansas law could be used to allow the decedents' actions
to survive, H° the methodology of the Supreme Court in Moragne
supplied a sufficient basis to 'allow a federal maritime survival
action." Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that creation of a
federal remedy—one independent of state law—was the preferable
course.' ' 2
It has been submitted that the federal maritime wrongful death
1 °6
 Id. at 401 n.I5.
107 For a discussion of the need for uniformity in federal law see Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1529 (1969).
101 466 F.2d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 1972).
104 Id. at 904.
''° Id. at 910.
"' Id. at 909. The court, in discussing the case of Marsh v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 330 F.
Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1971), noted:
Although choosing to utilize state law, the Ohio district court did go on to remark,
"However, it should be noted that it is only a small leap from the decision in
Moragne to an acceptance of the survival of personal injury actions as an integral
part of the general maritime law." . . We are willing to make that leap.
466 F.2d at 910 n.9, quoting Marsh, 330 F. Supp. at 974.
112
 466 F.2d at 909-10.
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action created in Moragne is limited in application to actions stem-
ming from incidents in state waters. Further, it was suggested that
Congress has taken no action which would prevent a court from
using a survival theory to maintain recovery for pain and suffering
when the actions grow out of occurrences on the high seas. How-
ever, analysis revealed that the approach taken by the Third Circuit
in Dugas was deficient because it made access to a federal right
hinge on the existence of a state survival statute. While it has been
suggested that the First Circuit's approach in Barbe is preferable,
before a final determination of the propriety of the First Circuit's
decision can be made, the question of whether a federal remedy can
be fashioned must be addressed. When the Supreme Court over-
ruled The Harrisburg in Moragne, it grounded its decision, at least
in part, on the fact that the reason for disallowing wrongful death
actions at common law—the felony-merger rule 13—had long since
disappeared.'" If it is concluded that the reasons underlying the
common law rule that actions do not survive the victim's death have
vanished, it follows from the method of analysis used by the Su-
preme Court in Moragne that an additional justification exists for
finding a federal maritime survival action.
The common law did not recognize survival of actions. The
general rule was that no executor or administrator could sue or be
sued for any tort committed by or against the deceased.' ' 5 The rule,
expressed by the maxim actio personalis mortuir cum persona," 6
seems to have been grounded in the principle found in both Roman
and English law that a right of action was not transferable." 7
Because of the bilateral nature of contractural and delictual
rights—the fact that one is entitled to performance while the other
owes a duty—the act of one party was not allowed to change the
relationship." 8 Nor would the law make a change when a party
died." 9 Property rights however, lacked this bilateral character:
"Ownership is good as against the world." 120 Therefore, the rule
developed that property rights were transferable and thus survived,
while contractual and delictual rights did not. Subsequently the rule
" 3 398 U.S. at 382-84. "[Title common taw did not allow recovery for an act that
constituted both a tort and a felony. The tort was treated as less important than the offense
against the Crown, and was merged into, or preempted by, the felony." Id. at 382.
"4 398 U.S. at 381.
"5 J. Salmon, The Law of Torts § 23, at 69 (3d ed. 1912).
106
 "Personal actions die with the person." Id. The origin of the rule is obscure, which
has led to some fallacious conjecture. "Sb much at sea has scholarship been to account for the
rule with which we are dealing, that some have indulged the fancy that personalis in the
maxim must have originated in a misprint of poenaiis." 3 T. Street, The Foundations of Legal
Liability 61 (1906), •
3 T. Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability 61-62 (1906).
"° Id.
119 Id. at 62.
' 20 Id. at 63.
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evolved to allow survival of a cause of action for assumpsit. 121 Yet
the rule persisted that tort actions die with the person.' 22
The different treatment afforded actions based on property and
contractual rights as opposed to those based on personal rights
turned on the fact that trespass, the form for all tort actions, was
penal in nature;' 23
 consequently, when the wrongdoer died, it
seemed logical to allow the tort claim against him to lapse since he
could no longer he prosecuted for the criminal offense and because
the tort action derived from the Crown's action for criminal tres-
pass. 124
 When the victim died, the reason for disallowing survival of
actions was somewhat different. Here the felony-merger rule came
into play.' 25 At common law, the tort was considered less important
than the felony and merged into it. 126 Thus the civil action was ,
suspended until the criminal one was concluded. 127
 Since the
punishment for a felony was death and forfeiture of all property to
the Crown, at the conclusion of the criminal action there was no
property upon which to base the recovery sought in the civil suit. 128
The rule in this country has never been that a felon's property
is forfeited:' 29 -Although the felony-merger doctrine was applied to
delay civil suits until after the criminal trial, nothing prevented a
subsequent civil action.' 3 ° Nevertheless, American courts adopted
the rule that actions do not survive, 13 ' even though the rationale for
the felony-merger rule which provided that a felon's property was
forfeited to the state, never existed in America. Thus the parallel
between wrongful death actions and survival of actions is complete.
Both the common law rule against survival of tort claims and that
forbidding wrongful death actions were grounded in the felony-
merger rule. It is precisely because the rationale for the rule had
disappeared that the Supreme Court in Moragne overruled The
Harrisburg, creating a maritime wrongful death action.' 32 Follow-
ing the example of the Supreme Court in Moragne, it seems reason-
able that the First Circuit, when confronted with a product of the
archaic felony-merger rule in Barbe, created a federal maritime
survival action.
121
 Id. at 68.
122 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 577-78 (1927).
123 Id.
124 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971).
125 Id.
121
 Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61
(K. B. 1606).
127 Smith v. Selwyn [1914] 3 K.B. 98, 103. The reason for the rule may have been to
compel the injured person to prefer criminal charges. W. Prosser, supra note 124, § 2, at 8.
121 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970).
129
 Id. at 384.
131 See Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 185-88 (1867); Grosso v. Delaware, L. &
W.R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317,. 319-20, 13 A. 233, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
131 W. Prosser, supra note 124, § 126, at 899.
132 398 U.S. at 384-88.
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Barbe also comports with the other rationale stated by the
Court in Moragne. Of major significance to the Court in Moragne
was what it perceived as a striking legislative recognition of a public
policy in favor of wrongful death actions:' 33 every state had enacted
a wrongful death statute and several federal statutes allowed a
wrongful death action.' 34 As a matter of judicial integrity, courts
should be cognizant of legislative policy determinations and reflect
such determinations in decisional law. 135
Courts have historically turned to statutes for guidance and
have meshed the policies enunciated by the statutes with existing
common law principles. 136 The clear legislative policy in favor of
wrongful death actions provided yet another justification for the
Moragne decision. Similar reasoning supports the Barbe result.
There has been a considerable amount of legislation changing the
common law rule that actions do not survive. All states have to
some extent altered the rule and about half have allowed personal
injury actions to survive.'" Also, among federal statutes, FELA
and the Jones Act provide for survival actions. 138 These statutes
provide an unmistakable indication of public policy in favor of
survival actions. Following the lead of Moragne, the First Circuit
chose to incorporate this legislatively recognized policy into the
maritime law and allowed a survival action in the void left by the
legislature.
Moragne resulted in the emancipation of wrongful death actions
in admiralty from their previous dependence an state statutes and
thus established a uniform remedy in the federal courts. It was this
same desire for uniformity which served as the driving force behind
the First Circuit's decision in Barbe. The court in Barbe recognized
that while Moragne permits recovery for pain and suffering, its
application is limited to actions stemming from occurrences in state
territorial waters and that DOHSA does not permit recovery for
pain and suffering because of its "pecuniary loss" limitation. There-
fore, applying an analysis similar to that of the Supreme Court in
Moragne, the First Circuit created a federal maritime survival ac-
tion, sustaining an award of damages for the conscious pain and
suffering of a deceased tort victim in an action arising from events
on the high seas.
Viewed in the light of the evolution of maritime law; it is
133
 Id. at 390.
' 34 Id.
135 "This legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular
scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established has become itself part of
our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction but
also in those of decisional law." Id. at 390-91.
136 J. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934).
'" W. Prosser, supra note 124,
	 126, at 900.
lia See text accompanying notes 84 & 85 supra.
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submitted that the Barbe decision is correct. If followed by other
circuits, it will aid in providing a comprehensive and equitable
system of recovery within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
VINCENT SACCHETTI
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